No Welcome Mat, No Problem?: Federal-Question Jurisidiction After Grable by Ryan, Rory
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 80 
Number 2 Volume 80, Spring 2006, Number 2 Article 4 
February 2012 
No Welcome Mat, No Problem?: Federal-Question Jurisidiction 
After Grable 
Rory Ryan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan, Rory (2006) "No Welcome Mat, No Problem?: Federal-Question Jurisidiction After Grable," St. John's 
Law Review: Vol. 80 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol80/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NO WELCOME MAT, NO PROBLEM?:
FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION
AFTER GRABLE
RORY RYANt
I. INTRODU CTION .................................................................... 621
II. THE BASIC STRUCTURE: How ARTICLE III AND § 1331
INTERRELATE ....................................................................... 623
III. SECTION 1331 AND "ARISING UNDER" BEFORE GRABLE .... 626
A. Where To Look: The Well-Pleaded-Complaint Rule... 626
B. What To Look For: The Two Branches ........... 629
IV. GRABLE'S MODIFIED DEFINITION ........................................ 636
V. ANALYZING THE MODIFIED DEFINITION ............................. 639
A . N ecessity ........................................................................ 640
B. A ctually D isputed ......................................................... 645
C . S ubstantial ................................................................... 647
D . D isruptiveness .............................................................. 650
V I. C ON CLU SION ........................................................................ 653
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal-question jurisdiction has always been an elusive
concept at its boundaries. The amorphous, jurisdiction-granting
words of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 are: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."1  The key
words, "arising under," have proven to be two of the more
versatile words in the English language. They mean different
things in different contexts, and over time, they have evolved to
mean very different things even in the same context. Last term,
in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
t Assistant Professor of Law, Baylor Law School. I thank Matthew Eickman for
selflessly dedicating much time and providing invaluable guidance at every stage.
Chris Fahrenthold was a true research-assistant warrior who worked tirelessly
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1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993).
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Manufacturing,2 the Supreme Court issued the latest edition of
its "arising under" dictionary. This Article is a guide to that
edition. In this Article, I will attempt to provide a framework for
determining whether federal-question jurisdiction is present.
While there is much to debate regarding what the law in this
area should be, this Article avoids that question and instead
endeavors to synthesize the current state of the law after Grable.
Having clarified the Article's purpose, I must offer some
preliminary warnings. Federal-question jurisdiction cannot be
understood without its theoretical and historical contexts. While
many cases present easily identifiable federal questions, the
boundaries of federal-question jurisdiction "require sensitive
judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the
federal system."3  And while the new edition modifies the
definition of "arising under," the cases decided under earlier
editions retain much significance, and understanding them is
crucial to understanding Grable's new four-prong edition.
Accordingly, I will trace the evolution of the doctrine and policy,
which ultimately must shape the interpretation of the Grable
edition. I will explore, in depth, the four-prong test, synthesizing
the earlier case law and highlighting both ambiguities and
potential problems within the new test. Ultimately, I will
conclude that the Grable edition admirably answers more
questions than it creates.
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part II, I will outline
the basic structure of the subject-matter-jurisdiction inquiry. 4
There, I will explain the structure of Article III of the
Constitution, the significance of its use of the words "arising
under," and the interrelationship between those words in the
Constitution and the same words in § 1331. In Part III, I will
trace the pre-Grable interpretation of the federal-question
statute to provide the necessary context for understanding
Grable at a more than superficial level.5 In Part IV, I will detail
the Grable decision and how it both arrived at and applied its
new four-prong test.6 Finally, in Part V, I will analyze the four-
2 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005).
3 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986).
4 See discussion infra Part II.
5 See discussion infra Part III.
6 See discussion infra Part IV.
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prong test and provide a framework for applying it to future
cases.
7
II. THE BASIC STRUCTURE: How ARTICLE III AND § 1331
INTERRELATE
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
judicial power "shall extend" to certain categories of cases or
controversies, known as the heads of jurisdiction.8 Despite the
"shall extend" language, Article III is not a self-executing grant
of jurisdiction to the lower federal courts.9 That is, Article III
confers no jurisdiction on the federal district courts. 10 To have
subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal district courts need
congressional authorization.1' What purpose, then, do the heads
7 See discussion infra Part V.
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State [modified by the
11th Amendment];-between Citizens of different States;-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, of the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Id.
9 See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986); Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845).
10 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807; Cary, 44 U.S. at 245; John T. Parry, No
Appeal: The U.S.-U.K Supplementary Extradition Treaty's Effort To Create Federal
Jurisdiction, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 543, 561-62 (2003). In contrast to
lower federal court jurisdiction, Article III's grants of jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court are self-executing. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority To Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 23-24 (1981).
11 Cary, 44 U.S. at 245.
[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its origins in the
Constitution, is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to
this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the
modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the
sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) for the
exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them
in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for
the public good.
Id.; see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)
("Federal Courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that
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of jurisdiction serve in Article III, Section 2? The heads of
jurisdiction define the limits on Congress's power to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts. 12 In other words, Article III,
Section 2 defines the maximum reach of the federal judicial
power-it sets the limits on what jurisdiction Congress can give
its courts. 13 When Congress confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts, it must be able to point to one of the heads of jurisdiction
as authorizing that particular grant. Thus, determining subject-
matter jurisdiction is a two-step process. First, did Congress
confer jurisdiction? Second, if Congress did confer jurisdiction,
did Congress have the power under Article III, Section 2 to confer
that jurisdiction?
Rarely will jurisdictional fights involve the second step.
Modern federal-question litigation almost always concerns the
scope of the congressional authorization, § 1331. This Article
also focuses on the meaning of the congressional authorization.
But because § 1331 and Article III, Section 2 use the same
"arising under" phrase, distinguishing the two steps is needed, if
for no other reason than to prevent confusion.
Article III, Section 2 gives Congress broad power to confer
jurisdiction in cases "arising under" the Constitution and laws of
the United States. 14 The Constitution allows Congress to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts when a federal issue is merely a
potential ingredient of the case-even if the federal issue is not
likely to be disputed. 15 Osborn v. Bank of the United States
illustrates the breadth of congressional power.16 In Osborn,
Congress had authorized federal jurisdiction over all suits by or
against the Bank of the United States.1 7 The Court held that
is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant thereto.").
12 See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850)
("The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States,
but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised [by the lower federal
courts].").
13 See Julian Velasco, Congressional Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 711 (1997).
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... ").
15 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 823-24 (1824).
16 See id. at 823.
17 See id. at 817.
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Congress had the authority, under the "arising under" head of
jurisdiction, to confer federal jurisdiction even in a garden-
variety breach-of-contract suit against the Bank, because federal
law created the Bank and its right to contract, and because a
question about that authority could potentially be raised in any
suit against the Bank.18 While the Supreme Court has never
defined the precise boundaries of this power, 19 Osborn and its
progeny demonstrate an impressive breadth.
The federal-question statute uses the same "arising under"
phrase, but the statute requires far more than federal law being
merely a potential ingredient in the case.20 Although some
legislative history suggests that Congress may have intended to
confer all its power when it passed § 1331, and thus extend
jurisdiction to every case in which federal law forms a potential
ingredient, 21 the Court has construed the language much more
18 See id. at 823-25.
19 Scholars have long debated a theory of so-called "protective jurisdiction." See,
e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 169 (1990); Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of Power:
Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361,
363-64 (2002). The Supreme Court has been less interested than the scholars. See
Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) ('We have, in the past, not found the
need to adopt a theory of 'protective jurisdiction' to support Art. III 'arising under'
jurisdiction, and we do not see any need for doing so here .... ) (citation omitted).
20 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8
(1983).
The statute's "arising under" language tracks similar language in Art. III,
§ 2, of the Constitution, which has been construed as permitting Congress
to extend federal jurisdiction to any case of which federal law potentially
"forms an ingredient," and its limited legislative history suggests that the
44th Congress may have meant to "confer the whole power which the
Constitution conferred." Nevertheless, we have only recently reaffirmed
what has long been recognized-that "Article III 'arising under' jurisdiction
is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331."
Id. (citations omitted).
21 Id. In the legislative history accompanying § 1331, Senator Carpenter
remarked:
The Constitution says that certain judicial powers shall be conferred upon
the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion
delivered by Judge Story-I do not recollect now in what celebrated case it
was, whether Cohens vs. Virginia or some of those famous cases-said that
it is the duty of the Congress of the United States to vest all the judicial
power of the Union in some Federal Court, and if they may withhold a part
of it they may withhold all of it and defeat the Constitution by refusing or
simply omitting to carry its provisions into execution ....
... This bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers-
nothing more, nothing less.... [I]t seems to me that when Congress ought
2006]
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narrowly. 22 The next Part explores the evolving meaning of the
phrase "arising under" in § 1331.
III. SECTION 1331 AND "ARISING UNDER" BEFORE GRABLE
Grable clarified (or perhaps more accurately, modified) the
test for when a case "arises under" federal law under § 1331. But
Grable's test cannot be fully understood without appreciating
what came before it. Many pre-Grable cases remain important
because they have been synthesized into the Grable test or
address jurisdictional issues unchanged by Grable. Others are
simply essential to understand some of Grable's language and
rationale.
This section proceeds in two parts. First, I will briefly
outline the starting place for all § 1331 inquiries: the well-
pleaded-complaint rule. The well-pleaded-complaint rule tells
the court where to look to determine if a case arises under federal
law. Grable does not directly impact this rule. Second, I will
outline the underlying question that Grable addressed: what is
the court looking for in the well-pleaded complaint? In other
words, what kinds of federal issues in a well-pleaded complaint
make the case one that arises under federal law?
A. Where To Look: The Well-Pleaded-Complaint Rule
The well-pleaded-complaint rule is a where-to-look rule.
Under § 1331, a case does not "arise under" federal law unless
the "plaintiffs statement of his own cause of action shows that it
is based upon" the Constitution or laws of the United States. 23
This rule encapsulates two issues. First, to determine federal-
question jurisdiction, a court can only look to the plaintiffs
complaint, not to counterclaims or other claims by defendants. 24
to do what the Supreme Court said more than forty years ago it was its
duty to do, vest the power which the Constitution confers in some court of
original jurisdiction.
2 CONG. REC. 4986-87 (1874).
22 E.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (assuming
congressional preclusion of federal private remedies for violations of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act also precluded jurisdiction under § 1331); Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 1 (1983) (holding cause not removable where a federal claim would only arise as
a defense to a state cause of action).
23 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
24 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-
31 (2002).
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Second, the court can only look at the well-pleaded part of the
plaintiffs complaint. The well-pleaded part includes only that
part that is necessary to maintain a viable cause of action. 25 It
includes neither defenses the plaintiff anticipates nor the
plaintiffs responses to those anticipated defenses. 26
The leading case is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Mottley, which involved a breach-of-contract claim brought in
federal court. 27 The Mottleys were injured on a railroad. 28 They
then settled their negligence claims with the railroad and
obtaine4l lifetime passes on the railroad in exchange for their
release. 29  The railroad stopped honoring the passes when
Congress enacted a federal statute prohibiting certain free-
transportation contracts. 30 The Mottleys sued the railroad in
federal court, seeking specific performance of the contract. 31 In
their complaint, the Mottleys argued that the federal statute did
not apply to their contract, and alternatively, that if the statute
did apply, it was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. 32
Although the Mottleys' allegations showed that "very likely, in
the course of litigation, a question under the Constitution would
arise, they [did] not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiffs
original cause of action, arises under the Constitution."33
Although the suit would likely require the Court to construe a
federal statute and determine its constitutionality, those
questions arose outside the well-pleaded complaint. 34  The
questions appeared in the plaintiffs complaint, but not in the
25 See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936); Bar J Sand & Gravel,
Inc. v. W. Mobile N.M., Inc., No. Civ. 05-800JBWPL, 2005 WL 3663689, at *6
(D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2005) (" '[A]ny statements in the complaint which go beyond a
statement of the plaintiffs claim.., are to be disregarded' in deciding whether
federal question jurisdiction exists." (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Martinez,
519 F.2d 479, 481 (10th Cir. 1975))); John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does What 'Arise Under" Federal Law?, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1834-35 (1998).
26 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840-41 (1989); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); see Christopher A. Cotropia,
Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 7 (2004).
27 211 U.S. at 149.
28 Id. at 150.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 150-51.
31 Id. at 150.
32 Id. at 151.
33 Id. at 152.
34 Id. at 153.
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well-pleaded portion.35 Rather, those questions appeared only as
anticipated defenses or responses to anticipated defenses.36
The well-pleaded-complaint rule still survives, often
eliminating federal jurisdiction in cases where the principal-or
indeed only--contested question involves federal law.37  For
example, the well-pleaded-complaint rule prevents removal based
upon the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment 38 or a
federal preemption defense. 39 Nor is federal jurisdiction properly
based on the presence of a counterclaim created by federal law,
even a compulsory one. 40 The Court has also extended the well-
pleaded-complaint rule to the declaratory judgment context. 41
As noted above, Grable does not alter the well-pleaded-
complaint rule. The rule still tells us where to look to find the
federal issues. Grable impacts the next step, determining what
35 Id. at 153-54.
36 Id. at 154.
37 See generally Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question
Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717 (1986) (explaining that removal to a federal forum
depends on whether the plaintiff could have invoked that forum); Richard E. Levy,
Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 634, 639 (1984) ('The well-pleaded complaint
rule withdraws from original federal jurisdiction a large number of cases that
eventually do turn on the validity of a federal defense, and such cases are within the
purposes of federal question jurisdiction.").
38 See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1998).
39 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)
(finding removal to federal court inappropriate based upon a defense of preemption
by federal law). One exception to the well-pleaded-complaint rule is the complete-
preemption doctrine. As recently reformulated, the complete-preemption doctrine
allows a defendant to remove a case when the plaintiff asserts a state-law claim that
falls within the scope of an exclusively federal cause of action. Such a claim, we have
learned, is really federal. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 (2003).
Justice Scalia's dissent aptly notes the oddity of this "federalize-and-remove"
exception to the well-pleaded-complaint rule. Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832-
34 (2002). Although Vornado was a case interpreting the congressional grant of
patent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the analysis applies equally to § 1331. As
the Court noted, "[i]t would be an unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy to
say that § 1338(a)'s 'arising under' language means one thing (the well-pleaded-
complaint rule) in its own right, but something quite different (respondent's
complaint-or-counterclaim rule) when referred to by § 1295(a)(1)." Id. at 833-34; see
also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-10 (1988)
(maintaining that a defense arising under patent law does not qualify for federal
jurisdiction).
41 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1950).
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kind of federal issues in that well-pleaded complaint give rise to
federal-question jurisdiction.
B. What To Look For: The Two Branches
Two distinct branches exist under § 1331. The first branch is
common, uncontroversial, and easily applied. The second branch
has created problems since its inception. Unsurprisingly, Grable
is a second-branch case.
The so-called Holmes Test covers the first branch: the easy
federal-question cases. It states that when federal law creates
the cause of action that the plaintiff asserts, the case "arises
under" federal law. 42 So, for example, if the plaintiff sues under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 43 jurisdiction is
proper under § 1331 because federal law created the cause of
action. Similarly, a claim "arises under" federal law when
federal common law creates the cause of action.44
Justice Holmes intended his test as one of exclusion. In his
view, a suit arises only "under the law that creates the cause of
action."45 The test is as easily applied as it is stated. If state law
creates a plaintiffs cause of action, the case arises only under
state law, regardless of the presence of federal issues. Since
§ 1331 only grants jurisdiction in cases that arise under federal
law, a state-law-created cause of action could never trigger
§ 1331 jurisdiction.46 The Holmes Test has survived, but only as
a test of inclusion. When federal law creates the plaintiffs cause
of action, the case still "arises under" federal law. 47 Those are
branch one cases.
Branch two was born when the Court rejected the Holmes
Test as one of exclusion. In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
42 See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
43 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
44 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("We see no reason
not to give 'laws' its natural meaning, and therefore conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction
will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory
origin.") (citation omitted).
45 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 215 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
46 See id. at 214-15.
47 Some have mentioned a possible narrow exception where even a claim created
by federal law will not satisfy § 1331. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S.
505, 507 (1900). Shoshone has sparse modern progeny, and Professor Oakley has
recently concluded that it did not actually involve a federally created cause of action
at all. Oakley, supra note 25, at 1841 n.63.
2006] 629
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Co., Smith filed a shareholder derivative suit under Missouri law
in federal district court against a corporation. 48 Missouri law
created a derivative cause of action that allowed shareholders to
enjoin corporations from purchasing unlawful bonds. 49 Smith
sought to enjoin the corporation from purchasing bonds
authorized by the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 ("Act"). 50 He
alleged that those bonds were unlawful because the
Federal Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional. 51  The Act's
unconstitutionality was the only theory he offered to support his
claim, and indeed was the only issue disputed in the case.52
Thus, while Missouri state law created Smith's cause of action,
his well-pleaded complaint necessarily raised a question of
federal law as an element of that state law claim. The Court
rejected the Holmes Test as one of exclusion and held that the
case arose under federal law.5 3 Thus, the second branch was
born. The Holmes Test still works as a test of inclusion-when
federal law creates the plaintiffs cause of action, the case arises
under federal law-but even when state law creates the
plaintiffs cause of action, the suit may arise under federal law if
federal issues are embedded in the state law cause of action.
So what types of federal issues embedded in state-law claims
make a case arise under federal law? Smith confirmed that there
is a second branch but failed to define its boundaries. 54 In the
years that followed, no precise definition appeared. 55 Essentially,
the answer became a pragmatic one based on a certain amount of
judicial intuition-the presence of a federal issue in a state-law
48 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921).
49 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367
(2005) (construing Smith).
50 Smith, 255 U.S. at 195.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 199.
5 See id. at 202.
54 See id. at 213-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55 See generally William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a
Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967) (analogizing
federal question jurisdiction to a puzzle); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It,
Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction Over Cases of Mixed
State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1985) (discussing federal question
jurisdiction in hybrid cases involving state and federal law); Paul J. Mishkin, The
Feaeral "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953) (noting that
jurisdiction under § 1331 has not stretched to the limits of Article III); David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing in
support of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction).
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claim made the case arise under federal law when it seemed the
federal court should be empowered to hear it.56 Justice Cardozo
wrote: "What is needed is something of that common-sense
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which
characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of
causation[,] ... a selective process which picks the substantial
causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside."57 Cardozo's
statement teaches that the federal issue must be "substantial," a
requirement that remains today after Grable.
In 1983, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, the Court summarized both branches:
Under our interpretations, Congress has given the lower federal
courts jurisdiction [under § 1331] to hear ... only those cases in
which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal
law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.58
Franchise Tax Board seemed to reaffirm unequivocally the
existence of the second branch. Although applying its test still
required a secret decoder ring to sort through the kaleidoscopic
situations, Franchise Tax Board taught that an embedded
federal issue in a state-law claim sufficed to invoke federal-
question jurisdiction when the federal issue was both "necessary"
and "substantial."
Three years later, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson 59 cast serious doubt upon the existence of the second
branch, and much ink was spilt by contemporary courts and
commentators debating just what Merrell Dow did to the scope of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.60  While Grable recently
56 See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562 (2d ed. 1984).
Rather than attempting a test it might be wiser simply to recognize that
"the existing doctrines as to when a case raises a federal question are
neither analytical nor entirely logical," and that in the unusual case in
which there is a debatable issue about federal question jurisdiction,
pragmatic considerations must be taken into account.
Id.
57 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936).
58 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
59 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
60 See, e.g., William V. Luneberg, Nonoriginalist Interpretation-A Comment on
Federal Question Jurisdiction and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 757 (1987); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of
20061
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clarified what Merrell Dow "really" meant, a complete post-
Grable synthesis of the law requires an understanding of that
debate.
The Merrell Dow facts were not complex. The plaintiffs were
mothers who had taken the drug Bendectin during pregnancy
and whose children later developed birth defects. 61 In their
state-court petition, plaintiffs alleged six causes of action:
negligence, gross negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, strict
liability, and negligence per se.62 The first five causes of action
relied entirely on state law, but the sixth contained a second-
branch, embedded-federal-issue problem. Negligence per se is, of
course, a state-law-created cause of action. But that cause of
action involved a federal issue because, as their sole basis for
proving negligence per se, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants misbranded the drug in violation of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act ("the Drug Act").6 3 Citing § 1331 and
relying on the Franchise Tax Board decision, the defendants
removed the case, essentially alleging that the construction of the
Drug Act, a federal issue, was both necessary and substantial. 64
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the federal issue was
necessary but not substantial, and thus jurisdiction was
improper. 65
When the Sixth Circuit examined whether Merrell Dow
could remove based upon the presence of an embedded federal
issue, it held that there was no "necessary" federal question. 66 In
the above-quoted Franchise Tax Board language, the Court had
stated that the plaintiffs right to relief must necessarily depend
upon the resolution of a question of federal law. 67 Yet, in Merrell
Dow, five of the plaintiffs' six causes of action involved no issue of
federal law. So, the Sixth Circuit held, the plaintiffs' right to
relief did not necessarily depend upon the Drug Act's
Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the
"Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769 (1992); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal
Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115
HARv. L. REV. 2272 (2002).
61 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 806-07.
65 See id. at 807-17.
66 See id. at 806-07 (construing the Sixth Circuit's decision).
67 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1983); see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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construction because they could recover under five different
causes of action without even referencing federal law. 68
The Supreme Court held that this case did not fail at the
"necessary" stage.69 Instead of looking at the plaintiffs' right to
recover in the aggregate, the Court held that necessity is
determined on a claim-by-claim basis.70  The "necessary"
component was satisfied because the negligence per se claim
necessarily depended upon a question of federal law, even though
the plaintiffs asserted other claims. The Court determined that,
if the negligence per se claim presented a "sufficient federal
question, its relationship to the other, state-law claims would be
determined by the ordinary principles of [supplemental
jurisdiction]."71 Part V.A will explore the necessity prong in more
detail.72
Although there was a necessary federal issue, the Court
found that there was no federal-question jurisdiction because the
federal issue was not "substantial." The Court noted that the
Drug Act did not expressly create a private cause of action, and
both parties conceded that the Drug Act did not contain
an implied cause of action.73 The Court held, over a vigorous
dissent, that a "congressional determination that there should be
no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is
tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a
claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of
action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-question
jurisdiction."74 The Court continued:
68 See Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 766 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir.
1985) ("Because the jury could find negligence on the part of Merrell Dow without
finding a violation of the FDCA, the plaintiffs' cause of action did not depend
necessarily upon a question of federal law.").
69 Cf. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817 n.15.
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 See discussion infra Part V.A.
73 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810-11.
74 Id. at 814. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, countered (with the weight of the
legal academy behind him): "Why should the fact that Congress chose not to create a
private federal remedy mean that Congress would not want there to be federal
jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim that imposes liability for violating the federal
law?" Id. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The
Trouble with Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1477, 1524-25 (1991) ("Merrell Dow's confusion of jurisdictional and substantive
inquiries hampers the court's discretion to determine whether the federal issue
raised by the state claim merits a federal forum in accordance with the purposes of
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The significance of the necessary assumption that there is no
federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For
the ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly
emphasized, is that it would flout congressional intent to
provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the federal
statute. We think it would similarly flout, or at least
undermine, congressional intent to conclude that the federal
courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction
and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely
because the violation of the federal statute is said to be
[actionable] under state law, rather than a federal action under
federal law. 75
Many contemporary courts and commentators read this
opinion as nearly eliminating the second branch.7 6  In his
treatise, written after Merrell Dow, Professor Chemerinsky
altered the Franchise Tax Board test to state:
A case arises under federal law if it is apparent from the face of
the plaintiffs complaint either that the plaintiffs cause of
action was created by federal law or if the plaintiffs cause of
action is based on state law, that a federal law that creates a
cause of action is an essential component of the plaintiffs
claim.77
Merrell Dow's meaning was the subject of much guessing.78
Should it be read to overrule Smith implicitly, where jurisdiction
existed even though the Federal Farm Loan Act did not create a
private cause of action? In Merrell Dow, the Court cited Smith
but never stated that it was overruled.7 9 Yet, the Court wrote
that exercising jurisdiction over a second-branch case would
"flout, or at least undermine" congressional intent when the
federal statute did not create a private cause of action.8 0 Indeed,
section 1331."); Redish, supra note 60, at 1794 ("As Justice William Brennan
correctly pointed out ... such an unformed, subjective test provides neither guidance
nor predictability in the shaping of federal question jurisdiction.").
75 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812.
76 See supra note 60 (citing articles that debate Merrell Dow's effect on the scope
of federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
77 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2 (4th ed. 2003) (emphasis
added).
78 See supra note 60 (listing articles that discuss Merrell Dow's meaning).
79 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814-15 n.12. In fact, the Court also noted the
"widely perceived 'irreconcilable' conflict" between Smith and Moore v. Chesapeake &
Ohio R.R. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), where no jurisdiction was found in a similar
embedded-issue case. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814-15 n.12.
80 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812.
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the Court conspicuously noted that this was the "first case" in
which it had reviewed a second-branch case since it had
reformulated its implied-cause-of-action test.81 This conspicuous
note seemed to signal that the law was indeed changing, and the
lower courts were left without significant guidance, resulting in
divergent views over how much of branch two was left after the
Merrell Dow massacre.8 2
Several circuits subsequently held that the second branch
only covered cases where federal law provided a parallel private
cause of action.8 3  For example, suppose a state consumer-
protection statute provides for treble damages and that violations
of other specified federal and state "tie-in" statutes are also
deemed violations of the consumer-protection statute. Even if
one of the tie-in statutes is federal, and even if that federal
statute creates its own cause of action, a plaintiff seeking treble
damages may choose to assert that violation under the state
statute. To avoid flouting, or at least undermining, congressional
intent, some circuits viewed the second branch as only
encompassing circumstances.
Other circuits refused to read Merrell Dow so restrictively.
In those circuits, a federal issue could still be "substantial"
without Congress specifically providing for a federal remedy.8 4
81 Id. at 811.
82 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. Indeed, a Harvard Law
Review note, published in 2002, revealed an amazing statistic: between 1994 and
2002, the courts of appeals heard sixty-nine second-branch cases, reversing the
lower court in forty-five of those cases. See Note, supra note 60, at 2280.
83 See, e.g., Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 223 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding
there can be no federal "jurisdiction where Congress has determined that there
should be no private cause of action for violation of the federal law"); TCG Detroit v.
City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 622 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (relying on Merrell Dow and
Professor Chemerinsky's distillation of Merrell Dow to require a federal private
cause of action); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. NASD, 159 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)
(reasoning that Merrell Dow indicates that "federal question jurisdiction cannot lie
absent a private right of action to enforce the federal right" in § 1331 suits); Seinfeld
v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[u]nder Merrell Dow,
therefore, if [sic] federal law does not provide a private right of action, then a state
law action based on its violation perforce does not raise a 'substantial' federal
question") (quoting Utley v. Varian Assocs., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1987))
(internal quotations omitted); Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(writing that in Merrell Dow "a closely divided Court held that if Congress
affirmatively determines that there should be no private federal cause of action that
is effectively the end of the matter").
84 See, e.g., Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 759 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding that Merrell Dow "clearly left open the possibility of federal jurisdiction even
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Those cases, however, are difficult to reconcile with Merrell
Dow's warning against flouting congressional intent. Some even
suggested that branch two only covered embedded constitutional
claims, because in those situations there was no analogous
congressional intent to flout.8 5
Even if read to its utmost, the Merrell Dow edition of the
"arising under" definition did not eliminate the second branch
entirely. But just how much of branch two was left? That was
the question Merrell Dow left open, and the question was
answered differently by judges and scholars for the twenty years
following Merrell Dow. Finally, in Grable, the Supreme Court
answered, teaching that Merrell Dow was actually decided under
a previously unarticulated prong to the "arising under"
definition.
IV. GRABLE'S MODIFIED DEFINITION
Grable was a second-branch case involving an embedded
federal tax issue within a state quiet-title claim. 86 To satisfy a
tax delinquency, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") seized
some of Grable's real property.8 7 The IRS then sold the property
to Darue and gave Darue a quitclaim deed.88 Five years later,
Grable brought a quiet-title action against Darue in state court.8 9
While Grable conceded that it had received actual notice of the
seizure, Grable claimed that Darue's record title was invalid
in the absence of an express or implied federal cause of action"); Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that by
requiring federal causes of action, "the State construes both federal question
jurisdiction and IGRA [Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] too narrowly and
underestimates the federal interest at stake"); Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98
F.3d 799, 807 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The determination of whether a federal issue is
sufficiently substantial should be informed by a sensitive judgment about whether
the existence of federal judicial power is both appropriate and pragmatic."); W. 14th
St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 196 (2d Cir. 1987)
("[A]ssuming that plaintiffs have no private right of action under [the Federal
Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Act], we conclude that the federal element in
plaintiffs' state cause of action would still be sufficiently substantial to confer arising
under jurisdiction.").
85 See Alleva, supra note 74, at 1527 n.186 (outlining competing interpretations
of Merrell Dow).
86 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363,
2366 (2005).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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because the IRS had not strictly complied with the applicable
notice provisions,90 which Grable contended required personal
service. Darue removed the case to federal court, arguing that
Grable's quiet-title claim, while created by state law, contained
an embedded federal issue, namely the interpretation of the
federal tax statute's notice provision.91
The Supreme Court began by reaffirming the second
branch's vitality. The Court noted that the federal-question
statute is "invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of
action created by federal law."92 But, the Court continued, there
is "another longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety
of federal 'arising under' jurisdiction, this Court having
recognized for nearly 100 years that in certain cases[,] federal
question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate
significant federal issues."93 The Court categorized Smith as the
"classic example" of a second-branch case and proceeded to
reaffirm the second branch's existence.94 But Merrell Dow, which
had sparked so much debate, loomed in the background. The
Grable opinion synthesized the second-branch cases, settled the
debate over Merrell Dow, and provided a new definition for
second-branch cases: jurisdiction is proper in a second-branch
case when a "state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal
issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum
may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." 95
The new definition quoted above consists of four prongs: (1)
necessity; (2) actually disputed; (3) substantiality; and (4)
disruptiveness. The first three existed before Grable and the
fourth represents the Court's view of what Merrell Dow really
meant. Below, I will detail how the Court applied the test to find
jurisdiction proper in Grable. Then, in Part V, I will evaluate the
four prongs in the post-Grable world.
The Court easily concluded that Grable's claim passed the
necessity and actually disputed prongs. Grable's claim
necessarily raised the federal tax issue because the state law
90 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a)-(b) (2000).
91 Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2366.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2366-67.
94 Id. at 2367.
95 Id. at 2368.
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required Grable to specify the facts establishing the superiority
of its title, and the only basis Grable had to claim a superior title
was the IRS's failure to give personal notice of the property's
seizure.96 In addition, the federal issue was actually disputed;
indeed, the Court noted, the meaning of the tax statute appeared
to be the only legal or factual issue contested in the case.97 While
Grable did not implicate any difficult issues involving the first
two prongs, Part V explores them in more depth.98
The Court also concluded that the federal tax issue was
substantial. The tax issue was an "important issue of federal law
that... belong[ed] in a federal court."99 The Court noted that the
government has a strong interest in prompt and efficient tax
collection and that the "ability of the IRS to satisfy its claims
from the property of delinquents requires clear terms of notice to
allow buyers like Darue to satisfy themselves that the Service
has touched the bases necessary for good title."100  Thus, the
Court held, the government has "a direct interest in the
availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own administrative
action, and buyers... may find it valuable to come before judges
used to federal tax matters."101
Finally, the Court turned to the fourth prong,
disruptiveness. As noted above, the disruptiveness prong is the
new part of the test, and it represents the Court's view of what
Merrell Dow really meant. Recall Merrell Dow, where the Court
found no federal-question jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
negligence per se claim, which contained the embedded Drug Act
issue. The Merrell Dow Court, we thought, resolved the case at
the substantiality prong because the Drug Act did not create its
own private right of action: "[A] congressional determination
that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of [a]
federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that
the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of
a state cause of action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer
federal-question jurisdiction." 102 But Grable teaches that Merrell
Dow is not really a substantiality case at all. In Grable, the
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See discussion infra Part V.
99 Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986).
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Court noted that the absence of a private right of action under
the Drug Act affected the Merrell Dow result in two ways. 10 3
First, it is "worth some consideration in the assessment of
substantiality,"' 10 4 but its "primary importance," 10 5 we now know,
is found in the disruptiveness prong.
We now know, from Grable, that the Merrell Dow Court saw
the missing Drug Act right of action "not as a missing federal
door key, always required, but as a missing welcome mat,
required in the circumstances, when exercising federal
jurisdiction" would disrupt the congressionally approved balance
of federal and state judicial responsibilities.1 0 6 Because finding
jurisdiction over the negligence per se claim would have
"attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising
other state claims with embedded federal issues," a welcome mat
was required. 10 7
No welcome mat was required in Grable because allowing
jurisdiction over the quiet-title claim would not be disruptive, as
it would have been in Merrell Dow. Although Congress
"indicated ambivalence.., by providing no private right of action
to Grable, it is the rare state quiet title action that involves
contested issues of federal law .... Consequently, jurisdiction
over actions like Grable's would not materially affect, or threaten
to affect, the normal currents of litigation."'0 8
Thus, the Court concluded that jurisdiction was proper
under the second branch because Grable's state-law claim
necessarily raised a federal tax issue, which was actually
disputed and substantial. It also provided what is Grable's
addition to the "arising under" dictionary: allowing jurisdiction
over quiet-title claims with embedded tax issues is not disruptive
enough to require a welcome mat. The next Part analyzes the
four prongs in greater depth.
V. ANALYZING THE MODIFIED DEFINITION
As noted above, second-branch cases now involve a four-
prong jurisdictional inquiry. When a state-law claim contains an
103 Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2370.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2371 (footnote omitted).
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embedded federal issue, the federal issue must be: (1) necessary;
(2) actually disputed; (3) substantial; and (4) accompanied by a
welcome mat, if exercising jurisdiction would be disruptive.
A. Necessity
A state law claim must "necessarily raise a stated federal
issue."'10 9 The necessity prong requires a distinction between
claims and theories. Again, recall Merrell Dow. There, the
Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's holding that the
embedded Drug Act issue was not necessary. 110 In Franchise Tax
Board, the Court had stated that the plaintiffs right to relief
must necessarily depend upon federal law."' The Sixth Circuit
applied that language to the Merrell Dow plaintiffs and
concluded that because the plaintiffs could have recovered on five
separate claims that involved no issues of federal law, the
plaintiffs' right to relief did not necessarily depend upon federal
law. 112 The Supreme Court rejected this narrow view of necessity
and concluded that federal law need only form a necessary
element of one of the plaintiffs claims."13 Whether jurisdiction is
proper over the remaining claims is determined by principles of
supplemental jurisdiction. 1 4 Because the plaintiffs' negligence
per se claim necessarily depended on the Drug Act, the necessary
prong was satisfied.
But let's change the Merrell Dow facts slightly. Suppose the
plaintiffs had asserted two theories to support their negligence
per se claims-one alleging the violation of the Drug Act and
another alleging the violation of a state statute. Then would
federal law form a necessary element of that claim? The answer
is probably not, though distinguishing claims from theories is not
always clear.
The claims-versus-theories distinction originated in
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.1"5 Although
Christianson was decided in a different context, many courts
have applied its reasoning in § 1331 cases. The issue in
109 Id. at 2368.
110 See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 n.15 (1986).
n- Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S 1, 19-20
(1983).
112 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817 n.15.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
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Christianson was whether the federal circuit had jurisdiction
over an appeal. The federal circuit has jurisdiction over appeals
from final district court decisions when the district court had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.116 Section 1338 provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents .... ,1 17  The Court noted that both § 1338 and § 1331
contained the terms "arising under" and held that linguistic
consistency demanded that the terms be construed similarly. 118
Thus, the Court evaluated whether the plaintiffs' claims
necessarily raised an issue of patent law.
The plaintiffs had asserted two antitrust claims under the
Sherman Act: a monopolization claim under Section 2 and a
group-boycott claim under Section 1.119 The plaintiffs had
alleged alternative theories to support each claim, but not all of
the theories involved the patent laws. 120 The Court noted that
federal jurisdiction focuses on claims, not theories. 121 A claim
arises under the patent laws only if a question involving the
patent laws is necessary to that claim. Accordingly, a "claim
supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form
the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential
to each of those theories. ' 122 Ultimately, the Court held that
because each of the plaintiffs claims were supported by
alternative theories unrelated to the patent laws, the patent laws
were not necessary to either claim; therefore, the case did not
arise under the patent laws. 123
Due to the Court's focus upon linguistic consistency with the
term "arising under," it is unsurprising that lower courts have
extended this test to the necessity prong of the second-branch
federal-question test. For example, in Willy v. Coastal Corp., the
plaintiff asserted a wrongful-discharge claim created by state
116 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).
117 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
118 See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-09; accord Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 833-34 (2002).
119 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 Id.
123 Id. ("The patent-law issue, while arguably necessary to at least one theory
under each claim, is not necessary to the overall success of either claim.").
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law. 124 The plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he refused
to violate various state and federal environmental and securities
laws. 125  The court characterized the plaintiffs wrongful-
discharge claim as relying upon at least two alternative theories:
first, that the plaintiff was fired for refusing to violate federal
law; and second, that he was fired for refusing to violate state
laws. 126 Relying on Christianson, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that jurisdiction was improper under the second branch because
federal law was not a necessary element of the state-law claim. 27
Distinguishing claims from theories is not always clear. For
example, in Merrell Dow, the Court held that the Drug Act was a
necessary element of the plaintiffs negligence per se claim. The
plaintiff had also asserted a vanilla negligence claim, but the
Court treated negligence per se and negligence as different
claims, and thus federal law was only necessary to one of the
claims. Had the Court treated negligence as the claim and
negligence per se as one of the theories supporting the claim, the
claim would have failed the necessity test because the plaintiffs
vanilla negligence claims had nothing to do with federal law.
While the lines between theories and claims are not entirely
clear, several principles, which can be synthesized from the
discussed cases, guide the inquiry. First, surely whether federal
law is necessary should not depend upon how the plaintiff
numbers the counts in the complaint. Suppose a plaintiff,
sharing the same claims as the Willy plaintiff, wants his case to
be tried in federal court. Federal jurisdiction cannot depend
upon how that plaintiff numbers the counts. It should be
immaterial whether the plaintiff separately numbers his
wrongful discharge counts or whether the complaint contains
only one Roman numeral within which the plaintiff asserts all
reasons supporting wrongful discharge. While many
jurisdictional principles depend upon the plaintiff being the
master of the complaint, which issues qualify for second-branch
treatment should not depend on the complaint's organization.
The second-branch inquiry is designed to select claims that,
while created by state law, deserve a federal forum. The
124 855 F.2d 1160, 1162(5th Cir. 1988).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1170.
127 See id. at 1171; accord Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346-47 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171).
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necessity prong is one step in that inquiry, and allowing the
plaintiff to manipulate the outcome by mere numbering would be
inconsistent with a process that is supposed to involve selection
of worthy federal issues through a "common-sense
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations. 128
The second principle that guides the necessity inquiry is
that, when a plaintiff asserts different ways in which a defendant
violated a particular section of a statute, the allegations under
that section form a single claim. Further, the ways in which the
defendant is alleged to have violated that section are theories, all
of which must depend upon federal law to satisfy the necessary
prong. For example, in Christianson, though the plaintiff alleged
different ways in which the defendant violated the group-boycott
provision of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court treated
those allegations as involving a single group-boycott claim
supported by alternative theories. 129  Similarly, in Dixon v.
Coburg Dairy, Inc., the Fourth Circuit rejected jurisdiction.' 30
There, the plaintiff asserted a violation of a South Carolina
statute that made it "unlawful for a person to... discharge a
citizen from [his or her] employment or occupation ... because of
political opinions or the exercise of political rights and privileges
guaranteed ... by the Constitution and laws of the United States
or by the Constitution and laws of [South Carolina]." 131  The
plaintiff, who had been fired for bringing a toolbox to work with a
Confederate battle flag decal, asserted that his firing was illegal
because it violated the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, South Carolina public policy, and the South
Carolina Constitution.' 32 Although the plaintiff asserted these
theories in "separate counts" of his complaint, the court correctly
treated the statutory wrongful discharge claim as a single claim
and rejected jurisdiction because federal law was not essential to
all of the theories supporting that claim.1 33
Third, a plaintiff who asserts violations of different statutory
sections, even within the same statute, asserts multiple claims,
only one of which must necessarily depend upon federal law.
128 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936).
129 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 813 (1988).
130 Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 2004).
131 Id. at 814-15 (citation omitted).
132 See id.
133 See id. at 818.
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Again, looking to Christianson, the plaintiff alleged violations of
two sections of the Sherman Act.134 The Court construed the
complaint as stating two claims-one based on each section-and
not merely one Sherman Act claim. To satisfy the necessity
prong, resolving the question of federal law must be necessary to
all the theories supporting one claim.135
While distinguishing between common law claims and
theories can potentially be more difficult, most cases are not. For
example, other courts have followed Willy and determined that
wrongful discharge is a single claim and the reasons why the
discharge was wrongful are theories, all of which must depend
upon federal law to satisfy the necessity prong.136 Similarly, if a
plaintiff invokes multiple statutes as establishing a duty for
negligence per se, those multiple statutes provide different
theories for the claim, and if any of those theories are based on a
state statute, federal law cannot be a necessary element of the
negligence per se claim. Additionally, Merrell Dow provides a
basis for analogy when the plaintiff asserts closely related
grounds of recovery. Recall that there, the Court construed
negligence and negligence per se as different claims, only one of
which had to depend necessarily upon federal law.137 A more
questionable distinction appears in Broder v. Cablevision
Systems Corp., a recent case where the plaintiff sued a cable
company for breach of contract. 138 In that case, the contract
obligated the cable company to disclose and charge rates "subject
to applicable law."' 39  The plaintiff asserted that the cable
company breached the contract because it violated both a federal
statute and a state statute. 140 The court held that the plaintiffs
complaint contained two separate breach-of-contract claims, even
134 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810.
Framed in these terms, our resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this
case is straightforward. Petitioners' antitrust count can readily be
understood to encompass both a monopolization claim under § 2 of the
Sherman Act and a group-boycott claim under § 1. The patent-law issue,
while arguably necessary to at least one theory under each claim, is not
necessary to the overall success of either claim.
Id.
135 See id. at 810-11.
136 See, e.g., Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1996).
137 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 n.15 (1986).
138 Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2005).
139 Id. at 192.
140 See id. at 191.
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though both relied upon the same contract and indeed the same
provision. 141
In summary, the necessity prong is determined on a claim-
by-claim basis. Federal law must be a necessary element of a
state law claim. So long as that test is satisfied, jurisdiction over
remaining claims will be determined by principles of
supplemental jurisdiction. 142  But federal law will not be a
necessary element of a state-law claim when that state-law claim
is supported by alternative theories, unless each of those
alternative theories requires resolution of a federal issue.
B. Actually Disputed
In a second-branch case, "the federal issue in a state-law
claim must actually be in dispute to justify federal-question
jurisdiction."'143 In Grable, the parties actually disputed the tax
issue, and indeed it "appear[ed] to be the only legal or factual
issue contested in the case."1 44 Thus, the actually disputed prong
was satisfied. The Court distinguished an older quiet-title case
because, in the older case, "the federal statutes on which title
depended were not subject to 'any controversy respecting their
validity, construction, or effect.' '"145 While the following
paragraphs explore this prong in some detail, I will ultimately
conclude that the requirement that a federal issue be "actually
disputed" is probably best left to the substantiality prong.
The Court's treatment and articulation of this prong raises a
timing anomaly. Federal-question jurisdiction is usually
determined from the face of the plaintiffs complaint, yet it is
unclear how we can determine what issues are actually disputed
from the plaintiffs complaint. In Grable, because the case was
removed, the Court knew the issue was disputed because it could
compare the plaintiffs complaint with the notice of removal. But
what if the plaintiff had filed the case originally in federal court?
Would the Court look to the answer or a motion to dismiss?
Suppose plaintiffs file a second-branch case in federal court, and
suppose a federal issue appears on the face of the well-pleaded
141 See id. at 194-95.
142 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
143 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363,
2369 n.3 (2005).
144 Id. at 2368.
145 Id. at 2369 n.3 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 570 (1912)).
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complaint. When does the court determine whether the federal
issue is actually disputed? Does the inquiry end with the
answer? What if the defendant's answer disputes the federal
issue, but after discovery progresses the defendant clarifies that
she no longer disputes the federal issue, but still disputes other
issues in the case? Subject-matter jurisdiction can, after all, be
raised at any time. Does the fact that the federal issue is no
longer disputed divest the court of jurisdiction?
Unless refined, this prong seems to be in tension with the
well-pleaded-complaint rule.146 The well-pleaded-complaint rule
has its critics, 147 but it has survived largely because it avoids the
type of timing questions raised in the preceding paragraph. The
rule often operates to remove from federal jurisdiction even cases
that turn entirely on federal law, when the federal issue arises
only by way of defense or counterclaim. 148 It has survived,
rightly or wrongly, because of the efficiency that results from
being able to determine jurisdiction from the outset. If I were
writing on a clean slate, I might suggest that federal-question
jurisdiction should indeed depend on which federal issues are
actually disputed, but a candid synthesis of what the law is must
account for the ever-looming well-pleaded-complaint rule.
Given the survival of the well-pleaded-complaint rule, it is
difficult to conclude that the Court meant, in this narrow context,
to direct lower courts to look beyond the plaintiffs complaint. If
a court must wait for an answer to determine whether the issue
is actually disputed, it is hard to see why a court cannot also look
to the answer to find substantial, disputed federal defenses.
True, such a distinction would retain some notion of the plaintiff
146 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 56, § 3562.
This formulation... seems seriously deficient as a guide to judgment. The
test would be difficult, if not impossible, to apply, in view of the rule that
jurisdiction must be determined from plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.
The complaint by itself can hardly disclose on what aspects of the case
there will be dispute or controversy.
Id.
147 See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy:
Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 599-600 (1987) (arguing that federal courts
should abandon the well-pleaded-complaint rule).
148 See id. at 599 (noting that "even if a case turns upon an important question
of federal law, and even if that is the only issue in the case, federal question
jurisdiction does not exist unless the federal question appears in the 'right' place,
that is, in the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint") (footnote omitted); see also supra
notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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being "master of his complaint." But the master-of-the-complaint
mantra alone is not so much of a justification as it is a tidy
restatement of the result of being able to determine jurisdiction
from only the plaintiffs pleadings. Once federal-question
jurisdiction inquiries proceed to the defendant's answer, it is
difficult to justify-under what is left of the well-pleaded-
complaint rule-declining jurisdiction when an answer reveals a
substantial federal defense or counterclaim.1 49
The Supreme Court's treatment of this prong suggests no
calculated departure from the well-pleaded-complaint rule.
Indeed, perhaps the Court means that the federal issue raised by
the plaintiff must be actually and reasonably disputable. This
rephrasing seems more consistent with the Court's treatment of
the older quiet-title case where the Court rejected jurisdiction
because the "federal statutes on which title depended were not
subject to 'any controversy respecting their validity, construction,
or effect.' "150 If the federal issue is settled or the answer to the
federal question is clear, its presence in a state-law cause of
action should not trigger federal jurisdiction.
Ultimately, this prong is unlikely to create many problems.
While I have discussed its possible implications, its impact on
second-branch cases will probably be negligible. The prong
appeared because the Grable Court had to distinguish some older
quiet-title cases. The "actually disputed" language will likely be
repeated in headnote form but should not be extended to intrude
upon the well-pleaded-complaint rule because its concerns about
federal issues being "not subject to any controversy" are
adequately addressed by the substantiality prong, which is
discussed below. If a federal issue is not subject to any
controversy, it simply is not substantial.
C. Substantial
The federal issue embedded in the state-law claim must be
"substantial." No precise definition of substantiality is available,
and the precedents in this area are reconcilable only because the
149 Unless, of course, the silent distinction is that resorting to the answer in the
context of the actually disputed prong would decrease the availability of federal-
question jurisdiction and in the context of a federal defense or counterclaim would
increase the availability.
150 Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2369 n.3 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Shulthis v.
McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 570 (1912)).
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Court has made the "test sufficiently vague and general, [such
that] any set of results can be 'reconciled'" with a post hoc
analysis. 151
Substantiality depends upon the nature and importance of
the embedded federal issue. 152  This broad statement about
"nature and importance" can be further broken down. Is there a
special need for federal expertise in this matter?153 Is there a
special need for uniformity? 154 Will the issue's resolution reach
beyond the instant dispute into areas of particular federal
concern? 155 Along with the nature and importance of the federal
issue on a national scale, some have suggested that courts should
consider how prominent the federal issue is in the particular
lawsuit, or in other words, how "central" the federal issue is to
the dispute between the parties. 56 This centrality concern seems
better suited for the necessity prong, and indeed considering it
within the substantiality prong seems to conflict with Merrell
Dow. The necessity prong covers how prominent the federal
issue must be in a lawsuit. If the federal issue is necessary to
one claim, the impact of other claims is determined under the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 157 which includes provisions
151 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 822 n.1 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
152 See id.
153 See U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 2002)
(discussing the embedded admiralty question).
154 See City of Beatrice v. Aquila, No. 4:05CV3284, 2006 WL 208831, at *6 (D.
Neb. Jan. 25, 2006) ("If resolution of a federal issue in a state forum could, because
of different approaches and inconsistency, undermine the stability and efficiency of a
federal statutory regime, the need for uniformity becomes a substantial federal
interest which warrants the exercise of federal question jurisdiction."); County of
Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(noting a trend of seeking uniformity in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction); see
also Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 826 (Brennan, J., dissenting); U.S. Express Lines, 281
F.3d at 391.
155 See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368; see also Municipality of San Juan v.
Corporacion para el Fomento Econ 6 mico de la Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 148 n.6
(1st Cir. 2005) ("Because the propriety of COFECC's conduct turns entirely on its
adherence to the intricate and detailed set of federal regulatory requirements, and
the funds at issue are federal grant monies, we agree with the magistrate judge and
district court that jurisdiction is proper."); Astra USA, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1027
(saying that a federal issue is substantial when it "directly affect[s] the functioning
of the federal government).
156 See Brianna J. Fuller, Federal Question Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1443, 1459-61 (2004).
157 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817 n.15.
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for declining supplemental jurisdiction when state claims
predominate. 158
Ultimately, the generalizations are just that: general.1 59
Justice Brennan seemed to be correct in arguing that the
precedents in this area are reconcilable only because the
standards are general enough to mold to any desired post hoc
reconciliation. 60 This, of course, leaves much room for advocacy.
The Grable case raises the most compelling of the
substantiality concerns. There, resolving the federal tax issue
would reach well beyond the parties and impact an area of
unique federal concern, IRS tax sales. As one court stated, one
suggested approach to determining whether a federal issue is
substantial is to determine whether resolving the federal issue
would "directly affect the functioning of the federal
government.''161 In Grable, the Supreme Court noted:
The meaning of the federal tax provision is an important issue
of federal law that sensibly belongs in a federal court. The
Government has a strong interest in the 'prompt and certain
collection of delinquent taxes,' and the ability of the IRS to
satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents requires clear
terms of notice to allow buyers like Darue to satisfy themselves
that the Service has touched the bases necessary for good
title. 162
While stare decisis will, of course, cause any ruling to reach
beyond the parties, and while presumably all federal laws are
important, the Grable case involved the government's interest "in
the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own
administrative action.. ."163 Grable also implicated the other
two concerns: the need for uniformity and federal expertise.
State courts infrequently address federal tax statutes, and the
need for uniformity was important for the reasons noted above.
158 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (2000).
159 See Fuller, supra note 156, at 1455-65.
160 See Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2000)
(concluding that in a second-branch case, "[w]hat remains is the almost
unanswerable question of whether the Supreme Court would regard the federal
issue in this case as sufficiently important to confer 'arising under'
jurisdiction ... ").
161 County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1027 (N.D.
Cal. 2005).
162 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363,
2368 (2005) (citation omitted).
163 Id. (emphasis added).
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It seems unlikely that the Court will find jurisdiction proper
when a federal issue is embedded in a garden-variety state tort
claim or when the parties incorporate a federal law into a private
contract. Before Grable, most courts would have held that such a
claim did not contain a "substantial" federal issue, but after
Grable clarified that Merrell Dow was not a substantiality case,
how the federal issue is incorporated is probably best left to the
"disruptiveness" prong. The substantiality prong focuses upon
the nature and importance of the federal issue. How that issue is
embedded or incorporated does not impact the need for
uniformity or federal expertise. Rather, it impacts whether a
welcome mat is needed. 164 Phrased differently-and perhaps too
candidly-the substantiality prong appears to represent whether
the court thinks this issue deserves federal resolution. The
disruptiveness prong accounts for the structural reality that
Congress, not the courts, has the final say in what issues deserve
federal resolution.165
D. Disruptiveness
A court cannot exercise second-branch jurisdiction if doing so
would disrupt the "congressionally approved balance of federal
and state judicial responsibilities."' 166 The disruptiveness prong
is a potential veto, grounded in the principle that Congress
controls federal jurisdiction. Even when a federal issue is
necessary, actually disputed, and substantial, jurisdiction is
improper if exercising it would be disruptive.1 67  Exercising
jurisdiction is disruptive if Congress has provided no welcome
mat when one is needed. Note, though, that not all cases require
a welcome mat.
As a preliminary matter, a welcome mat will rarely exist in a
second-branch case. A welcome mat exists when a plaintiff
asserts a state-law claim that incorporates a federal law and
when Congress provided a federal private right of action for
violations of the federal law. A welcome mat is rare in second-
branch cases because, ordinarily, when a case involves a federal
164 See infra Part V.D; see also Buis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 401 F. Supp. 2d 612,
615 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
165 Congress's final say, of course, is regulated by the Constitution. See supra
Part II.
166 Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
167 See Buis, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
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statute that creates a cause of action, the plaintiff will have sued
under that statute. That is, most cases involving cause-of-action-
creating federal statutes are first-branch cases. 168 If a welcome
mat is present in a second-branch case, the disruptiveness
inquiry ends, and jurisdiction is proper as long as the other three
prongs are met.
But a welcome mat is not always needed. The presence of a
federal right of action for the embedded federal law is not a
"missing federal door key, always required," but is rather only a
welcome mat, needed when exercising jurisdiction over a class of
cases would materially disrupt the flow of litigation between
state and federal courts. 169 Contrasting Grable and Merrell Dow
provides the starting place for determining when this welcome
mat is needed.170
In Merrell Dow (as construed by Grable) jurisdiction was
absent because hearing the case without a welcome mat would
have been disruptive. There, the plaintiffs incorporated the Drug
Act standard into their negligence per se claim. The Drug Act
did not create a private right of action-it contained no welcome
mat.171 A welcome mat was required because allowing garden-
variety tort claims into federal court when they incorporated
federal law would have "heralded a potentially enormous shift of
traditionally state cases into federal courts."' 72  As the Court
noted, "One only needed to consider the treatment of federal
violations generally in garden-variety state tort law. 'The
violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given
negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.' ",173 When
allowing a type of embedded issue into federal court would
attract a "horde of original filings and removal cases," federal
courts need the congressional welcome mat-even if they view
the issue as substantial enough to warrant federal
adjudication. 174
168 See supra Part III.B (suggesting how a second-branch case could involve an
embedded federal statute that creates a cause of action).
169 Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2370.
170 See, e.g., McCormick v. Excel Corp., No. 05-C-0740, 2006 WL 229029, at *2
(E.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2006) ("The cases before me are closer to Merrell Dow than
Grable.").
171 Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2371 (construing Merrell Dow).
172 Id. at 2370-71 (construing Merrell Dow).
173 Id. at 2370 (citation omitted).
174 Id.
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By contrast, in Grable, federal-question jurisdiction was
proper despite the absence of a welcome mat because only the
"rare state quiet title action. . . involves contested issues of
federal law."175 As the Court noted, exercising "jurisdiction over
actions like Grable's would not materially affect, or threaten to
affect, the normal currents of litigation."' 176
The disruptiveness prong is based mostly on concerns about
separation of powers. Congress is responsible for defining the
federal courts' jurisdiction. Deciding whether jurisdiction is
proper is supposed to be an exercise in statutory construction.
But until Merrell Dow, jurisdiction depended largely upon
judicial views of the proper allocation of jurisdiction. Merrell
Dow introduced the novel concept of congressional intent into the
jurisdictional inquiry, but its reasoning was unpersuasive.
Grable found a middle ground, requiring express congressional
approval before significantly altering the federal docket, but
allowing jurisdiction in those rare cases where the phrase
"arising under" can fairly reflect implicit congressional approval
based on the impossibility of Congress laying welcome mats for
the myriad unforeseeable ways in which federal issues may arise.
Given the sensitive concerns outlined above, Grable's
proceed-without-a-welcome-mat holding should not be read too
broadly. Garden-variety tort claims often involve embedded
federal issues, and Merrell Dow teaches that a welcome mat is
needed in such cases. 177 Thus, exercising jurisdiction in cases
like negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, and
wrongful discharge would be disruptive and cannot genuinely be
distinguished from Merrell Dow. 78  It would be similarly
disruptive to allow private parties to incorporate federal
175 Id. at 2371.
176 Id.
177 See RA Inv. I, LLC v. Smith & Frank Group Servs., No. 4:05CV363, 2005 WL
3299710, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2005) (gathering post-Grable cases involving tax
issues embedded in tort claims); Cantwell v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., No. Civ.A.
305CV1378-D, 2005 WL 2296049, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2005).
178 See Leggette v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 3:03-CV-2909-D, 2005 WL 2679699, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) ("Exercising federal jurisdiction over home foreclosure
disputes typically governed by private contract and state law portends a significant
transfer of judicial responsibilities from state to federal courts."); Sarantino v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., No. 4:05MD1702 JCH, 2005 WL 2406024, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29,
2005); State v. Abbott Labs., 390 F. Supp. 2d 815, 823 (W.D. Wis. 2005) ("By
contrast, the present case is one of many that have been filed by states across the
country concerning pharmaceutical companies' alleged fraud in price-setting.").
[Vol. 80:621
FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION
standards into their contracts and create jurisdiction where
Congress has not.179 And importantly, the Court clarified that
disruptiveness is a veto, separate from concerns about
substantiality. The separation of powers concerns underlying the
disruptiveness prong cannot be alleviated by a court's view about
the importance of the federal issue. Grable teaches that is a
separate inquiry.
VI. CONCLUSION
Grable's new edition confirms that the second branch lives.
Its four-prong test, while certainly not providing a bright line,
creates a workable structure when the steps are kept
conceptually distinct. The first prong-necessity-and the well-
pleaded-complaint rule govern the placement of the federal issue
in the case and how prominent the federal issue must be in
relation to the lawsuit. The second prong-actually disputed-is
more conceptually troubling and is properly treated under the
substantiality prong. The third prong-substantiality-still
allows for judicial consideration of the need for federal
adjudication, considering the nature and importance of the
federal issue. The fourth prong-disruptiveness-is a possible
veto, grounded in the notion that Congress, not the courts,
controls federal jurisdiction. This latter prong requires restraint.
It is separate from the substantiality determination and requires
judicial deference to Congress's judgment about the proper
allocation of the federal judicial power.
Unless the second branch is entirely eliminated,180 complete
clarity in this area is unobtainable. If Grable is adhered to
faithfully, it will result in few second-branch cases properly
within § 1331. Whether that result is desirable can-and surely
will-be debated, but the Grable edition admirably answers more
questions than it creates and provides a reasonable structure for
the inquiry. This clarity is a welcome change to the post-Merrell
Dow world.
179 See Elmira Teachers' Ass'n v. Elmira City Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-6513 CJS,
2006 WL 240552, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006).
180 See Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2371-72 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting an
openness to consider a return to the Holmes test as one of exclusion). I view such
elimination extremely unlikely. Such a marked departure from a construction of
§ 1331 would require an inquiry into the meaning of § 1331, which would likely
reveal an implausible answer-that Congress probably intended to extend
jurisdiction to the constitutional maximum.
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